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MOVING TOWARD CAPE TOWN CONFIDENCE:
A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION’S ANNEX 7 AND BOLSTER RELIANCE
ON THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION’S AIRCRAFT
DE-REGISTRATION PROVISIONS
LAWRENCE DILLON KING III*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION REGIME (CTC)1 is in-creasingly looking as though it will become the preferred
* Lawrence Dillon King III is a graduate of the Remote Sensing, Air & Space
Law Certificate Program at the University of Mississippi School of Law where he
earned his J.D. in 2016. His admission to the New York State Bar is currently
pending after having scored successfully on the Uniform Bar Examination in July
2016. He has an M.B.A. and majored in economics for his B.A. The author would
like to thank Professor Christopher Petras, Adjunct Professor and ICAO Legal
Officer, for his support and guidance during the writing process, and Professor
B. Patrick Honnebier, Adjunct Professor and international aviation financing and
leasing attorney, for his influence regarding the subject matter of this article.
1 In this article, the CTC refers to the international legal regime resulting from
the combined effect of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment (Cape Town Convention) and the Protocol to the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft
Equipment (Aircraft Equipment Protocol) on the international aircraft financing
and leasing industry. The Cape Town Convention deals more broadly with “mo-
bile equipment of high value or particular economic significance.” Convention
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment pmbl., Nov. 16, 2001, 2307
U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention], http://www.unidroit.org/en-
glish/conventions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf [https://perma
.cc/39YF-TQS7]. The Aircraft Equipment Protocol is intended to “implement the
[Cape Town Convention] as it relates to aircraft equipment.” Protocol to the
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific
to Aircraft Equipment pmbl., Nov. 16, 2001, 2367 U.N.T.S. 599 [hereinafter Air-
craft Equipment Protocol], http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mo-
bile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ4W-N8YW]. Due to
the importance of both instruments with respect to aircraft financing and leasing,
and specifically this article’s analyses and conclusions, the abbreviation CTC is
commonly used throughout the article to refer to the cmbined effect of both
instruments for clarity and brevity. Where necessary though, the instruments are
also referred to individually as the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft
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legal foundation upon which nations across the globe bolster
their aircraft financing and leasing industries. As practitioners
in the field know, facilitating the ability to finance and lease air-
craft and aircraft equipment is crucial to spurring growth in the
field of aviation. Increased access to financing brings with it sig-
nificant benefits realized not only by businesses in the field, but
also by the everyday consumer of air travel—the passenger. 2
Historically, one of the biggest obstacles to the aircraft financing
and leasing industry was the lack of a substantive legal frame-
work that established uniform rules and a clear system of reme-
dies for rule violations.3 That lack of clarity led to a number of
major problems,4 caused decreased financier confidence,5 and
was a driving force behind the push for the CTC.6
The CTC, on the other hand, helps to solve this problem and
restore confidence. It embodies a substantive property law re-
gime that, inter alia, creates secured interests in aircraft, estab-
lishes rules prioritizing those interests, and provides for actual,
Equipment Protocol. For more information on the Cape Town Convention and
the Aircraft Equipment Protocol, see INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIV. L.
[UNIDROIT], http://www.unidroit.org/ [https://perma.cc/J5SR-A5LP].
2 Lorne Clark & Jeffrey Wool, Entry into Force of Transactional Private Law Trea-
ties Affecting Aviation: Case Study—Proposed UNIDROIT/ICAO Convention as Applied
to Aircraft Equipment, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1403, 1408–10 (2001).
3 See B. Patrick Honnebier, The Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment
Protocol: Protecting the Registered Secured Interests of Airline Lessees, 30 AIR & SPACE L.
27, 27–28 (2005).
4 Although countless others exist, the case of Kingfisher Airlines in India is
one of the most commonly cited examples of the devastating potential of the pre-
CTC system. That scenario involved a German financier that suffered “tremen-
dous” and unnecessary financial losses due to its leasing of two Airbus aircraft to
the Indian airline. Dean N. Gerber & David R. Walton, De-registration and Export
Remedies under the Cape Town Convention, 3 CAPE TOWN CONVENTION J. 49, 49–51
(2014). As Gerber and Walton emphasize, the aircraft financier suffered these
losses almost exclusively due to the lack of clear, unambiguous access to the abil-
ity to de-register the aircraft in India, despite the fact that the aircraft were actu-
ally repossessed by the financier. Id. Gerber and Walton go on to say that this
case, had it been resolved under the CTC, would have been resolved differently.
Id. at 50 n.2.
5 See PROFESSOR SIR ROY GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY TO THE CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON
MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT para. 2.4–2.6 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinaf-
ter SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY]; cf. Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 49
n.1 (discussing the importance of an aircraft financier’s ability to ensure prompt
access to necessary remedies—in particular, aircraft de-registration and export—
in the event of default, a risk analysis which can often lead to a financier’s deci-
sion to not finance an aircraft at all).
6 See Clark & Wool, supra note 2, at 1412–13.
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meaningful remedies to parties that have been wronged under
the regime.7 And it does so in a comprehensive manner.8
As with any convention, however, the CTC is not without its
problems. A comprehensive international convention can be a
source of confusion, rather than confidence, when some of its
provisions overlap with other previously established instruments.
This is particularly true of international conventions dealing
with aviation law, a field within which any new instruments are
potentially affected by (if not subordinate to) a host of other
instruments already in effect.9 The CTC is no exception. For in-
stance, one of the remedies specifically provided to creditors
under the CTC—the de-registration remedy—is only necessary
given the registration requirements and provisions of the Chi-
cago Convention.10 Yet the word “de-registration” itself is never
mentioned in the Chicago Convention,11 as will be discussed fur-
ther in Section III.
An ambiguity like this has the potential to cause confusion
and decrease confidence in an important regime such as the
CTC. This problem, then, provides the determinative questions
for this article. Does the Chicago Convention prescribe—or
should it prescribe—rules governing what constitutes an appro-
priate process (or method) of aircraft de-registration? If not,
then is it appropriate for the International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization (ICAO)12 to expressly clarify that neither the Chicago
7 See Honnebier, The Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol,
supra note 3, at 27–28.
8 See id.
9 The most obvious example is the Chicago Convention, which entered into
force on April 4, 1947, and is the cornerstone of international aviation law. See
Current Lists of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.
[ICAO], http://www.icao.int/Secretariat/Legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%
20parties/AllItems.aspx [https://perma.cc/3DWL-HCUY].
10 See infra notes 92, 94–95 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
12 The Chicago Convention led to the creation of ICAO and “sets forth the
constitutive provisions regarding ICAO, including its objectives, organs and insti-
tutional structure and status as an international intergovernmental organization.”
LUDWIG WEBER, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION
1 (Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 2007). In particular, ICAO is tasked with “[t]he
adoption of international standards and recommended practices (SARPS) in the
form of Annexes to the [Chicago] Convention, and amendments thereto.” Id. at
23. Having adopted 18 Annexes thus far, “one of its major functions in practice is
to keep these 18 Annexes up-to-date by adopting appropriate amendments.” Id.
This makes it ICAO’s role, likely through amending or adopting an Annex, to
expressly clarify this issue if such a clarification is necessary, which this article
argues is the case.
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Convention nor ICAO intends to prescribe or control any such
process?
Ultimately, as will be argued infra, ICAO should clarify that it
defers control over governing the aircraft de-registration process
to other legal instruments, such as the CTC, which are more
integrally affected by the process itself. This would help mitigate
some of the confusion surrounding the de-registration remedy
under the CTC, which is minimizing its effectiveness. Specifi-
cally, this article argues that Annex 7 of the Chicago Convention
should be amended to clarify that the Chicago Convention’s
terms are intended to defer control over the de-registration pro-
cess itself to other more appropriate instruments.
In Section II, this article will discuss the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention), and lay out its
rules of treaty interpretation which will be applied in later sec-
tions. In Section III, this article will discuss the Chicago Conven-
tion and its registration requirements. This section will discuss
the object and purpose of the Chicago Convention, its specific
registration provisions, and why de-registration methods do not
further the purpose of the Chicago Convention. In Section IV,
this article will discuss the CTC and its de-registration remedies,
as well as why those remedies are integral to the CTC’s purpose,
and why the CTC is the more appropriate regime to govern de-
registration. In Section V, this article will discuss how ICAO has
recently facilitated the aircraft financing and leasing industry’s
growth and how doing so in this case would yield a benefit. In
Section VI, this article will propose an amendment to Annex 7
of the Chicago Convention clarifying the Chicago Convention’s
limited role in governing de-registration. The proposed amend-
ment would clearly establish that ICAO takes a deference-based
approach towards governing the process of aircraft de-registra-
tion, which would further the ability of other legal instru-
ments—like the CTC—to implement effective, unambiguous
rules for the de-registration process. In Section VII, this article
will further emphasize why the current lack of clarity creates
problems and how the proposed amendment would help re-
store clarity and accelerate the growth of the aviation industry.
II. THE VIENNA CONVENTION’S RULES OF
TREATY INTERPRETATION
First, before delving into the interpretation of any interna-
tional treaty, an interpreter should identify the framework that
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will be applied to interpret that treaty.13 For the purposes of this
article, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vi-
enna Convention)14 will be used as the interpretive framework.15
This section will highlight its general interpretive rules so that
they can be applied to the Chicago Convention and to the CTC
in the following sections.
Broadly speaking, the Vienna Convention provides a two-pro-
nged method for interpreting a treaty. The first prong is the
“general rule of interpretation,” which provides that such an
agreement “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”16 It
further provides that “context” refers to the text of the agree-
ment, “including its preamble and annexes,” as well as “[a]ny
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty” and
“[a]ny instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.”17 Further-
more, in addition to context, an interpreter should consider
“[a]ny subsequent agreement between the parties” or “[a]ny
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty . . . regard-
ing its interpretation,” as well as any international law that ap-
plies to the relationship between the parties.18 Finally, a term is
deemed to have “special meaning” if such a meaning was in-
tended to be given to that term by the parties.19
13 This is especially true for the purposes of this article, which interprets both
the Chicago Convention, clearly a public law treaty, and the CTC, which embod-
ies both public and private law aspects. Cf. Clark & Wool, supra note 2, at 1403–04
(discussing the CTC’s embodiment of “private versus public law concepts and air
law versus non-air law practices” and how to view “entry into force questions” in
that context).
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
15 Although there is some debate on the subject of whether the totality of the
Vienna Convention should be applied to private law treaties, the interpretive
guidelines set forth in Articles 31–33 have been consistently used for that pur-
pose and are undoubtedly useful in such interpretations. See Ju¨rgen Basedow,
Uniform Private Law Conventions and the Law of Treaties, 11 UNIF. L. REV. 731,
741–46 (2006). For more information on this debate, see generally id., which
provides an in-depth discussion of why the Vienna Convention should be utilized
in the context of private law treaties.
16 Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 31(1).
17 Id. art. 31(2).
18 Id. art. 31(3).
19 Id. art. 31(4).
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The second prong under the Vienna Convention provides for
a “supplementary means of interpretation” in Article 32.20 This
supplementary means is to be utilized in two circumstances: to
either “confirm the meaning” uncovered through the general
rule’s application or “determine the meaning” where the appli-
cation of the general rule “[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure or [l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or un-
reasonable.”21 Article 32 further provides that this supplemen-
tary means of interpretation “includ[es] the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”22 In the fol-
lowing sections, this framework is applied to the Chicago Con-
vention and the CTC with an emphasis on interpreting
provisions relevant to aircraft de-registration.
III. REGISTRATION AND DE-REGISTRATION UNDER
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
To understand the importance of the CTC’s de-registration
remedies—and how any action by ICAO could strengthen those
remedies—one must begin with the Chicago Convention’s regis-
tration rules. The Chicago Convention forms the foundation for
much of international aviation law and resulted in the creation
of ICAO.23 As discussed in more detail infra, without the Chi-
cago Convention’s aircraft registration requirement there would
be no need for any de-registration remedy under the CTC.24 Ac-
cordingly, the Chicago Convention and its provisions relating to
aircraft registration and de-registration are analyzed in this sec-
tion, followed by an analysis of the CTC’s provisions relating to
aircraft registration and de-registration in Section IV.
A. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
To determine the object and purpose of a treaty, interpreters
often begin with the preamble. The preamble of the Chicago
Convention provides as follows:
WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation
can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and under-
20 Id. art. 32.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.
[ICAO], http://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/CZF3-TZPA].
24 See infra notes 92, 94–95 and accompanying text.
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standing among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its
abuse can become a threat to the general security; and
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that coop-
eration between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the
world depends;
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on
certain principles and arrangements in order that international
civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and
that international air transport services may be established on the
basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and
economically.25
Of course, the Chicago Convention, which entered into force in
1947, has been in existence for quite some time.26 As such, the
treaty and its specific provisions have been interpreted countless
times. It has been said that the Chicago Convention’s preamble
and provisions reflect a counterbalancing objective: the promo-
tion of the aviation industry from an economic standpoint while
increasing aviation safety.27 It is with this purpose in mind, then,
that the provisions of the Chicago Convention should be inter-
preted.28 Specifically, Subsection II.B analyzes the aircraft regis-
tration requirements under Chapter III of the Chicago
Convention in light of this purpose.
B. AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION UNDER THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
One of the foundational elements of the Chicago Convention
is its aircraft registration requirements.29 Specifically, Article 17
provides that “[a]ircraft have the nationality of the State in
which they are registered.”30 This is the major mechanism by
which the Chicago Convention achieves its safety goals. 31 It does
this by then assigning responsibilities and liabilities to the State
25 Convention on International Civil Aviation pmbl., Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S.
295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] (emphasis added).
26 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
27 See RONALD I.C. BARTSCH, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
19 (2012); JIEFANG HUANG, AVIATION SAFETY THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW: ICAO’S
MECHANISMS AND PRACTICES 17–22 (Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 2009).
28 See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 31.
29 Cf. RUWANTISSA I.R. ABEYRATNE, AVIATION TRENDS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
15 (2001) (“The most fundamental characteristic of an aircraft at international
law is its nationality.”).
30 Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 17.
31 See ABEYRATNE, supra note 29, at 14–15.
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of registry.32 In other words, it first requires the party or parties
in control of an aircraft to proclaim that aircraft’s “nationality”33
with respect to a specific Member State and second, assigns to
that Member State certain responsibilities with respect to main-
taining certain levels of safety.34 Therefore, the Chicago Conven-
tion (and by extension ICAO) can regulate safety by ensuring
that one State—the State in which the aircraft is registered—
takes international responsibility for an aircraft if violations of
its provisions exist.35
Equally as important for the purposes of this article, though,
is the next provision. Article 18 provides that “[a]n aircraft can-
not be validly registered in more than one State, but its registra-
tion may be changed from one State to another.”36 There are
two significant aspects of this article. First, this article (as indi-
cated by its title) prevents “dual registration” of an aircraft in
more than one State at a time.37 In other words, an aircraft can-
not, for example, be validly registered in both Canada and the
United States simultaneously. Second, it provides for the ability
to change the State of registration.38 In other words, if the air-
craft is originally registered in Canada, its registration may be
changed to the United States.
The single State of registry requirement itself is essential to
furthering the aviation safety purpose of the Chicago Conven-
tion. Allowing only one State to register an aircraft, and thereby
take responsibility for that aircraft with respect to a number of
safety concerns (e.g. that aircraft’s “airworthiness”), allows for
efficient and effective regulations in that regard.39 Therefore,
the requirement that one State take on the responsibility that
flows from registering that aircraft is tantamount to the Chicago
Convention’s ability to serve its aviation safety purpose.
An important preliminary question to ask is whether the Chi-
cago Convention prescribes, or even promotes, any particular
32 For instance, Article 31 of the Chicago Convention requires the State of
registry to “issue[ ] or render[ ] valid” that aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness.
Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 31; see BRIAN F. HAVEL & GABRIEL S.
SANCHEZ, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW 328–29
(2014).
33 See Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 17.
34 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
35 See HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 32, at 328–29.
36 Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 18.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
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registration process. The answer to that question is that it does
neither.40 The text of the Chicago Convention itself, in Article
19, provides that “registration or transfer of registration of air-
craft in any contracting State shall be made in accordance with
its laws and regulations.”41 In fact, it only requires, under Article
21, that the registering State report that registration to ICAO
and make certain data regarding that registration available
upon request.42 In other words, assuming that the registering
State has reported that registration to ICAO and has collected
appropriate data about that registration, the Chicago Conven-
tion leaves governance of the registration and transfer of regis-
tration processes within a particular State up to that State.43 For
instance, the Chicago Convention allows the United States to
determine that it will not allow non-U.S. citizens to register air-
craft in its country.44
This passiveness towards process-related issues makes sense in
light of the Chicago Convention’s aviation safety purpose as
well. The single-State registration requirement is only necessary
to promote aviation safety to the extent that the single-State sta-
tus is ensured.45 As long as the registration mechanism is ful-
filled, the Chicago Convention’s aviation safety purpose can be
enforced by holding the violating State of registry responsible.46
This is true regardless of how that State registered its aircraft, so
long as the aircraft is registered.47 Finally, this is confirmed
through the supplementary means of interpretation by subse-
quent state practice, given that a number of States have inter-
40 Nothing in the text of the Chicago Convention or its Annexes prescribes a
specific process by which States should register their aircraft. See generally Chicago
Convention, supra note 25.
41 Id. art. 19.
42 Id. art. 21.
43 Havel and Sanchez address the issue in the following manner:
Each State has complete flexibility, however, in deciding what re-
quirements it will impose for registration including whether it will
insist (as the United States has) that only its own citizens may own
aircraft placed on its register and whether (where ownership and
operation are separated, as in a lease) the registering entity should
be the owner or the operator or both.
HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 32, at 341.
44 Id.
45 Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the registration
requirements of the Chicago Convention are important simply because of the
responsibility a State assumes after registering aircraft).
46 See HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 32, at 328–29.
47 Id. at 340–41.
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preted this provision to give themselves freedom in tailoring the
registration of aircraft to their own needs.48
This leads to the issue of the Chicago Convention and
whether it controls, or should control, the de-registration of air-
craft. Two major issues for the purposes of this article are
whether de-registration is an implicit element in the concept of
transferring registration under the Chicago Convention and if
so, whether any particular method of aircraft de-registration
prior to re-registration is contemplated or furthers the Chicago
Convention’s purpose. Both issues are explored in Subsection
III.C infra.
C. CHICAGO CONVENTION PROVISIONS RELEVANT
TO DE-REGISTRATION
This article argues that ICAO should explicitly defer control
over the process of de-registering aircraft. Specifically, ICAO
should make it clear, by amending Annex 7 of the Chicago Con-
vention, that the Chicago Convention should not be construed
as an obstacle to other legal instruments that do appropriately
govern that process. This is supported by the fact that, as will be
discussed infra, the Chicago Convention was drafted to leave the
process of de-registration, implicit in its registration require-
ment provisions, outside of its scope.
The Chicago Convention does not promote or prescribe any
particular de-registration process.49 Applying the Vienna Con-
vention’s rules of treaty interpretation to the Chicago Conven-
tion’s relevant provisions leads to that conclusion. First, those
rules require an interpreter to look to the text of the Chicago
Convention with respect to whether any specific de-registration
method or process is mandated.50 A review of the Chicago Con-
vention shows no explicit mention of de-registration.51 Instead,
the Chicago Convention only implicitly recognizes the concept
of de-registration as an extrapolation of the prohibition on dual
registration, juxtaposed with the ability to transfer registration.52
As such, one must look at the explicit registration require-
ments to determine the extent to which any de-registration pro-
cess is implicitly promoted, if at all. Again, the text of the treaty
48 See id.
49 See Chicago Convention, supra note 25, ch. III.
50 See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 31(1).
51 See generally Chicago Convention, supra note 25.
52 See id. art. 18.
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with respect to registration requirements indicates that the
treaty neither prescribes nor promotes any process for register-
ing aircraft. In fact, it does quite the opposite, with Article 19
explicitly leaving the regulation of aircraft “registration or trans-
fer of registration” process to Member States.53 If no particular
method of registration itself is promoted, then it would hardly
make sense to promote any particular method of de-registration.
This is also confirmed by a careful interpretation of the Chicago
Convention’s registration provisions.
Two terms mentioned in Articles 18 and 19 have the potential
to implicate the concept of de-registration. The first is the term
“changed” in Article 18, which provides that an aircraft’s “regis-
tration may be changed from one State to another.”54 The sec-
ond is the term “transfer of registration” in Article 19, which
provides that “transfer of registration of an aircraft in any con-
tracting State shall be made in accordance with its laws and reg-
ulations.”55 Both of these Articles and their relevant terms are
discussed individually with regard to whether a process of de-
registration is implicated.
1. Analyzing Article 18
Applying the Vienna Convention’s “ordinary meaning” rule,56
dictionary definitions of words are logical starting points for un-
derstanding how those words should operate within a treaty.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the verb part of
speech for “change,” in pertinent part, as follows: “to make dif-
ferent in some particular,” “to replace with another,” and “to
undergo transformation, transition, or substitution.”57 The
noun part of speech is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: “the
act, process, or result of changing” and “substitution.” 58 Proba-
bly the conceptually closest definition to the Chicago Conven-
tion’s provision allowing for aircraft registration to “be
changed” from one State to another is the “transition” defini-
tion. In this way, a party in control of an aircraft could “transi-
tion” the registration of its aircraft from one State to another.
This understanding would seem to imply that some method or
process, however informal, of transitioning registration is neces-
53 Id. art. 19 (emphasis added).
54 Id. art. 18.
55 Id. art. 19.
56 Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 31(1).
57 Change, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
58 Id.
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sary to accomplish an aircraft registration’s changing. Although
the part of speech of “change” used in the Chicago Convention
is a verb, the “process” definition for the noun part of speech
seems to confirm that understanding of the ordinary meaning
of “change.” However, it is also important to note that none of
those definitions seem to reference the concept of any formal
renouncement process necessary before initiating “change.”59
The term “change” probably cannot be considered an intrinsi-
cally legal term. As such, it is not surprising that Black’s Law Dic-
tionary does not define the term “change” as a stand-alone
term.60 Although it does define a number of terms that include
the word “change,” only one of which can truly be said to pro-
vide even limited help in interpreting “change” under Article
18. That term is a “change-of-ownership clause.” Black’s Law Dic-
tionary defines a change-of-ownership clause as “[a] provision in
an oil-and-gas lease specifying what notice must be given to a
lessee about a change in the leased land’s ownership before the
lessee is obliged to recognize the new owner.”61 The concept of
a formal process prior to recognizing new ownership seems to
be helpful at first. However, given that this is a type of provision
specific to changing ownership of oil and gas leases—a very dif-
ferent proposition than changing the registration of an air-
craft—it is of limited significance in interpreting Article 18. A
general lack of any legally operative definition of change tends
to reflect that the word has little legal significance independent
of its ordinary meaning.62 Therefore, given the fact that the
term “change” does not intrinsically bear any legal significance,
the ordinary meaning of “change” bears more weight than it
otherwise would.63 The ordinary meaning of “change” tends to
indicate that the drafters of the Chicago Convention, in using
the word, may have contemplated that allowing a party to
change an aircraft’s State of registry would implicitly require
some sort of process or method of accomplishment; however, it
59 This is important because the process of de-registration, as it stands under
the CTC, is effectively a formal renouncement of the aircraft’s previous registra-
tion in the first State as a prerequisite for changing registration to the new State.
The term “change” itself, under these definitions, does not seem to require such
a formal renouncement process.
60 See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
61 Change-of-Ownership Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
62 In other words, given the dearth of any legal definition of change, it is logi-
cal to conclude that the drafters of the Chicago Convention likely intended to
give meaning to the ordinary definition of change.
63 See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 31(1), (4).
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also tends to indicate that the drafters did not intend to pre-
scribe or promote any sort of formal process for de-registering
aircraft in Article 18.
The immediate context of the term “change” is important, as
well.64 Located within Chapter III, “Nationality of Aircraft,” Arti-
cle 18 is immediately followed by Article 19, which makes “regis-
tration or transfer of registration” subject to the laws and
regulations of contracting States. 65 The drafters of the Chicago
Convention could have easily prescribed rules for the appropri-
ate transfer of registration from one State to another, but they
did not. 66 Instead, they explicitly put the establishment of such
rules within the domain of the relevant contracting State. 67
Again, this indicates that the Chicago Convention’s drafters,
even if they had contemplated the need for a formal de-registra-
tion process for the purposes of Article 17, deferred to the
States regarding the governing any such process. In other words,
the term “change” in context indicates that the Chicago Con-
vention does not prescribe or promote any de-registration
process.
This makes sense in light of the aviation safety purpose of the
Chicago Convention as well. The process of de-registering an
aircraft, assuming that process entails only requisite documenta-
tion (e.g. the CTC remedy), does not implicate aviation safety
concerns.68 By contrast, exporting an aircraft out of one jurisdic-
tion and into another would implicate aviation safety con-
cerns.69 Such an export would almost certainly entail actual
operation of the aircraft. Simply stated, if the aircraft is in work-
ing condition, the easiest way to export an aircraft is to fly it out
of the current jurisdiction and into the target jurisdiction.70
64 See id. art. 31.
65 Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 19.
66 See id.
67 Id.
68 Cf. Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 62 (quoting, with respect to the CTC-
envisioned de-registration process, SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra
note 5, para. 3.36 (stating that the CTC’s de-registration remedy should not be
subject to any safety laws or regulations given that the de-registration remedy “is
intended to be purely documentary” and its “purpose is to dispense with the need
for the authority to investigate any external facts”)). Gerber and Walton go on to
say that the CTC’s “de-registration remedy should made available without safety
regulations being relevant” given that “de-registration of an aircraft does not
mean that the aircraft is necessarily required to move and therefore that it must
be capable of lawful, safe operation.” Id.
69 Id. at 62–63.
70 Cf. id. (discussing the operation of an aircraft to export it).
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That operation of the aircraft necessarily implicates safety con-
cerns.71 On the other hand, where the process of de-registering
an aircraft merely requires the appropriate completion and sub-
mission of paperwork, no operation of the aircraft is needed. In
fact, such a de-registration itself would require nothing that
would implicate aviation safety concerns as contemplated by the
Chicago Convention’s purpose.72 Therefore, it makes sense that
the Chicago Convention does not prescribe any process for
changing an aircraft’s registration because no formal process, or
lack thereof, makes aviation any safer.
2. Analyzing Article 19
Again, the best place to start is with the ordinary meaning of
“transfer.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines, in perti-
nent part, “transfer” as follows: “to convey from one person,
place, or situation to another”; “to cause to pass from one to
another”; “to make over the possession or control of”; and “to
move to a different place, region, or situation; [especially] to
withdraw from one educational institution to enroll at an-
other.”73 The concepts both of moving to a different place or
region, particularly withdrawing from one institution in order to
enroll in another, and of causing to pass from one to another
seem to be conceptually closest to the idea of any de-registration
process.
Unlike “change,” though, the word “transfer” has special, le-
gal significance, which should also be considered. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “transfer” as follows: “Any mode of disposing
of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, including a
gift, the payment of money, release, lease, or creation of a lien
or other encumbrance” and “[a] conveyance of property or title
from one person to another.” 74 Both of these would seem to
describe the idea of transferring an aircraft’s registration from
one State to another. If the drafters of the Chicago Convention
had the first definition in mind, involving “disposing of or part-
ing with . . . an interest in an asset,” they likely contemplated
that some method of aircraft de-registration is implicitly neces-
71 Cf. WEBER, supra note 12, at 6 (stating “the term aviation safety relates to the
technical and operational safety of flight”).
72 See Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 62. This concept will be more thor-
oughly discussed in Section IV infra in the context of the CTC’s specific de-regis-
tration provisions.
73 Transfer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
74 Transfer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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sary in transferring registration as provided for in Article 19. If
they had the second in mind, de-registration may not have been
consciously contemplated to any significant extent. However, it
seems likely given both the ordinary meaning and legal signifi-
cance of the word “transfer,” that the drafters did in fact con-
template that some form of de-registration was an implicit
element of transferring registration.
If that is the case, the phrase “transfer of registration” in the
context of Article 19 lends even more credence to the fact that
the Chicago Convention does not purport to control how air-
craft are de-registered. This is because the substantive provision
of Article 19 makes it clear that the Chicago Convention defers
governance of any process for accomplishing the transfer of re-
gistration to other legal instruments or entities to the extent
that the transfer does not violate the relevant State’s laws.75 The
implication is that the process of transferring registration—
which would encompass de-registration—is not of major con-
cern to the Chicago Convention. In other words, if de-registra-
tion was contemplated as an implicit element of the phrase
“transfer of registration,” then any process for de-registering air-
craft is acceptable under the Chicago Convention, provided that
process accords with the relevant national laws.76 Still, even if de-
registration was not contemplated as such, the result is effec-
tively the same: that the Chicago Convention does not prescribe
or promote any particular de-registration process.77
IV. REGISTRATION AND DE-REGISTRATION
UNDER THE CTC
This section will focus on the CTC and its de-registration pro-
visions. Interpreting and analyzing these CTC provisions will
confirm the interpretation of the Chicago Convention in Sec-
tion III supra and illustrate the benefit of definitively establish-
ing a deference-based approach by ICAO to the governance of
de-registration. For this illustration to be effective, though, it is
75 See Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 19.
76 See id.
77 This second scenario is a logical conclusion based on the fact that the draft-
ers of the Chicago Convention could not possibly have prescribed or promoted
any particular process of aircraft de-registration if they did not contemplate a de-
registration mechanism in the first place. Regardless, it seems that they did con-
template such a mechanism, but instead chose to defer the governance of its
process to other legal frameworks, such as that of the States. See supra notes 67–69
and accompanying text.
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necessary to understand the CTC and how its provisions—most
importantly, its de-registration remedy—should be interpreted.
In exploring the CTC and the extent to which it deals with de-
registration, the Vienna Convention rules will again be applied
to interpret those relevant provisions.
A. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE CTC
First, it is important to determine the object and purpose of
the Cape Town Convention itself, as it provides the foundation
for the regime. The preamble of the Cape Town Convention
reads as follows:
AWARE of the need to acquire and use mobile equipment of high
value or particular economic significance and to facilitate the fi-
nancing of the acquisition and use of such equipment in an efficient
manner,
RECOGNISING the advantages of asset-based financing and leas-
ing for this purpose and desiring to facilitate these types of transac-
tion by establishing clear rules to govern them,
MINDFUL of the need to ensure that interests in such equip-
ment are recognised and protected universally,
DESIRING to provide broad and mutual economic benefits for
all interested parties,
BELIEVING that such rules must reflect the principles underly-
ing asset-based financing and leasing and promote the autonomy of
the parties necessary in these transactions,
CONSCIOUS of the need to establish a legal framework for in-
ternational interests in such equipment and for that purpose to
create an international registration system for their protection,
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the objectives and principles
enunciated in existing Conventions relating to such
equipment.78
In analyzing the language used by the preamble, phrases like
“the need . . . to facilitate the financing of the acquisition and
use of . . . equipment” and “desiring to facilitate [asset-based
financing and leasing] transaction[s]” makes it clear that a ma-
jor object of the Cape Town Convention is to protect private
78 Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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parties as they enter into asset-based financing and leasing trans-
actions of a cross-border nature involving mobile equipment.79
The Aircraft Equipment Protocol’s preamble merely echoes
the Cape Town Convention’s preamble. In fact, no individual-
ized “purpose” is mentioned, except that the Cape Town Con-
vention’s provisions should be implemented with a direct focus
on “aircraft equipment” and “the particular requirements of air-
craft finance.”80 Again, taken together, the emphasis of the CTC
is on the importance of facilitating the ability of entities with
sufficient resources to finance aircraft and aircraft equipment
assets.81 Thus, it is with this purpose in mind that one should
interpret the de-registration provisions promulgated under the
CTC.
B. THE CTC’S DE-REGISTRATION REMEDIES
The CTC is revolutionary in that it, inter alia, creates sui
generis security interests in aircraft and aircraft equipment.82 In
other words, prior to the CTC, there was no substantive property
law treaty that uniformly governed and protected security inter-
ests in cross-border, aircraft financing and leasing transactions.83
The CTC, in fact, provides a number of remedies for creditors
in resolving violations of their secured interest in aircraft and
aircraft equipment. In particular, Article IX of the Aircraft
Equipment Protocol gives creditors two specific rights which
79 See id.; B. Patrick Honnebier, The Convention of Cape Town on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment: The Solution of Specific European Property Law Problems, 3
EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 377, 381 (2002).
80 Aircraft Equipment Protocol, supra note 1, pmbl.
81 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. This is confirmed in Sir
Goode’s Official Commentary, which was developed with the approval of the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and can be
found in a number of scholarly publications. See SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 5, para. 2.6; see also Clark & Wool, supra note 2, at 1405; Hon-
nebier, The Convention of Cape Town, supra note 79, at 381, 384. Specifically, the
Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol together “are de-
signed to fulfil five key objectives,” the first four of which are tools or instruments
designed to protect transacting parties, the fifth of which describes those four
preceding tools as the “means to give intending creditors greater confidence in
the decision” to enter into such transactions. SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY,
supra note 5, para. 2.6.
82 See Jeffrey Wool & Andrej Jonovic, The Relationship between Transnational Com-
mercial Law Treaties and National Law—A Framework as Applied to the Cape Town
Convention, 2 CAPE TOWN CONVENTION J. 65, 74 (2013); see also Honnebier, The
Convention of Cape Town, supra note 79, at 377.
83 See Honnebier, The Convention of Cape Town, supra note 79, at 377; Wool &
Janovic, supra note 82, at 74.
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they may exercise in the event of a debtor’s default: (1) the right
to “procure the de-registration of the aircraft”; and (2) the right to
“procure the export and physical transfer of the aircraft object
from the territory in which it is situated.”84 As this article focuses
on how ICAO should approach the process of de-registering an
aircraft object, though, the de-registration remedy will be more
heavily discussed in this article.
The Aircraft Equipment Protocol contemplates two effective
“paths” for procuring the de-registration of aircraft objects as a
remedy.85 The first path is for a creditor to seek a proper court
order or grant of relief, as recognized under Article X(6) of the
Aircraft Equipment Protocol, and to submit that order to the
relevant registering authority.86 The second path, provided by
Article XIII and Articles IX(5)-(6) of the Aircraft Equipment
Protocol, “is available if the debtor provided an irrevocable de-
registration and export request authorization (IDERA)[,] which
was lodged with the requisite authorities.”87 Both of these
processes, though, in addition to the export and physical trans-
fer remedy, seem to be limited by the phrase “subject to any
applicable safety laws and regulations.”88 However, this issue has
been specifically addressed by Professor Sir Roy Goode in the
Official Commentary to the Convention on International Interests in
Mobile Equipment and Protocol Thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft
Equipment (Sir Goode’s Official Commentary), which provides as
follows:
The duty to honour the IDERA is subject to any applicable safety
laws and regulations (Article XIII(3)). These will normally be ap-
plicable only to export and physical delivery, not to deregistration.
As with the court route, the IDERA route is intended to be purely
documentary; the purpose is to dispense with the need for the au-
thority to investigate any external facts.89
84 Aircraft Equipment Protocol, supra note 1, art. IX (emphasis added).
85 In their article De-registration and Export Remedies under the Cape Town Conven-
tion, Gerber and Walton referred to these paths as “routes,” describing them as
“two separate and distinct Protocol-driven approaches for a financier to achieve
de-registration and export of an aircraft in a default scenario, the conditions and
terms of each varying somewhat depending upon which route is taken.” Gerber &
Walton, supra note 4, at 54.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 62.
89 SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 5, para. 3.36 (emphasis
added).
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In other words, because both of these processes of de-registra-
tion are “intended to be purely documentary”90 laws and regula-
tions aimed at safety concerns, they are irrelevant to the process
of de-registration, despite their acknowledged relevance to the
export remedy.91
C. HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATING THE NEED FOR THE CTC’S
DE-REGISTRATION REMEDY
It is also important to question why there is even a need for
the de-registration remedy provided by the CTC. As mentioned
supra, the CTC’s security interest framework overlaps in a num-
ber of places with other international aviation treaties. The ma-
jor area of overlap creating the need for a de-registration
remedy under the CTC is with the Chicago Convention’s prohi-
bition on dual registration.92
The need for a strong, unambiguous de-registration remedy is
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose a commercial
airline in State A wants to lease an aircraft from a leasing com-
pany in State B. A bank in State C, then, in exchange for a secur-
ity interest in the aircraft, agrees to finance the leasing
company’s purchase of an aircraft from an aircraft manufac-
turer in State D. After purchasing the aircraft, the leasing com-
pany enters into a lease agreement with the airline as it initially
requested. Finally, upon acquiring the aircraft from the leasing
company, the commercial airline registers the aircraft in State A
and begins to operate the aircraft to transport passengers.93
Assume further, however, that after operating the aircraft for
a short period of time, the commercial airline falls into financial
disrepair and defaults on the lease between itself and the leasing
90 Id.
91 See Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 62–63. For more information on the
technical aspects of the de-registration and export remedies, see generally id.,
discussing in great detail the necessity of a financier’s ability to combine these
remedies, as well as the extent to which these remedies are available under the
CTC.
92 See id. at 51; see also Professor Sir Roy Goode, Official Commentary to the
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and Protocol
Thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment para. 3.23 (rev. ed. 2008)
(describing the de-registration remedy under Article IX of the Aircraft Equip-
ment Protocol as “remov[ing] the Chicago Convention nationality registration”
so as to allow “re-registration in another Contracting State”).
93 This scenario is a simplified version of a fairly typical structure for aircraft
financing and leasing transactions. Cf. Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 50–51
(describing the comparable facts of the Kingfisher case and emphasizing the im-
portance of the de-registration remedy in such a context).
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company. As a result, the leasing company, in an appropriate
effort to mitigate losses, decides to repossess the aircraft and re-
lease it to another commercial airline in State E. The problem is
that the leasing company, even if it can successfully regain physi-
cal possession of its aircraft, would need to procure the aircraft’s
de-registration in State A. This is necessary because the State E
airline will likely refuse to enter into a lease without the ability
to register the aircraft in its own state, given the Chicago Con-
vention’s dual registration prohibition, prior to initiating opera-
tion.94 As a result, without the ability to procure de-registration,
a leasing company may be left with an aircraft no other airline is
willing to take, rendering the aircraft effectively worthless.95
If applicable,96 the CTC would govern such a scenario. Under
that regime, the defaulting commercial airline would be a
“debtor” and the leasing company a “creditor.”97 As a CTC credi-
tor, the leasing company would have access to the CTC’s de-
registration remedy, which it would be able to exercise to de-
register the aircraft in State A and re-lease it in State E. If not,
the leasing company, like the financier in the Kingfisher case,
may face substantial losses without the ability to promptly de-
register its aircraft.98
As illustrated by this hypothetical, the de-registration remedy
under the CTC necessarily implicates significant Chicago Con-
vention concerns under Article 18.99 Specifically, it illustrates
one of the major questions addressed in this article’s analysis: to
what extent does the Chicago Convention (or ICAO) control
the process of de-registration, given that other instruments (e.g.
the CTC) hold themselves out as controlling that process? The
next subsection explores why control over that process is more
suited to other legal instruments, such as the CTC, than to the
Chicago Convention or ICAO.
94 The ability to successfully de-register an aircraft is a condition precedent to
re-registering that aircraft in a new state. See SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY,
supra note 5, para. 5.11.
95 See Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 50–51.
96 The CTC applies if “the debtor is situated in a Contracting State.” Cape
Town Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1); see Aircraft Equipment Protocol, supra
note 1, art. II (adopting the Cape Town Convention’s applicability provisions as
its own). This is true regardless of whether the creditor at issue is a Contracting
State or not. Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
97 See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(i)–(j).
98 See Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 50–51.
99 See id.
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D. WHY THE CTC IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE REGIME TO
REGULATE DE-REGISTRATION
The CTC’s purpose would be significantly contravened in a
number of ways by an inability to explicitly recognize a specific
de-registration process. The purpose of the CTC, as mentioned
supra, is to facilitate the aircraft financing industry by protecting
parties with secured interests in aircraft equipment (such as air-
craft financiers). One of the most fundamental of these protec-
tions is the de-registration remedy provided by the CTC, which
itself relies upon a specific methodology to be valid.100 There-
fore, prescribing a specific process for de-registration is abso-
lutely essential to further the purpose of the CTC.
By contrast, not prescribing a specific de-registration process
does not contravene the aviation safety purpose of the Chicago
Convention. There is a strong argument that clear deference to
other more appropriate legal instruments (e.g. the CTC) would
be in furtherance of the Chicago Convention’s other major pur-
pose—facilitating the growth of the aviation industry. This argu-
ment follows from the idea that the advent of aviation financing
and leasing has significantly increased the economic potential of
the aviation industry101 and benefits everyone involved, includ-
ing the passenger.102 In fact, one of the major arguments as-
serted in favor of the CTC’s prompt entry into force is that
“[a]ccess to financing . . . will enhance aviation safety, the most
fundamental objective of all actors in the air transport sector.”103
The CTC is directly aimed at “facilitat[ing] the efficient financ-
ing and leasing of mobile equipment,” such as aircraft, to “assist
in the development of cost-effective modes of transport . . . to
bring significant economic benefits to countries at all stages of
economic development.”104 In other words, the CTC is meant to
establish a reliable financing and leasing regime as a tool for
increasing the economic potential of the aviation industry. Miti-
gating unnecessary ambiguity in other important legal instru-
ments like the CTC, then, would actually be in furtherance of
the Chicago Convention’s dual purposes.
Still, even despite the comprehensive nature of the CTC,
some of its provisions themselves (including the de-registration
100 See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text.
101 See SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 5, para. 2.1.
102 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
103 Clark & Wool, supra note 2, at 1410.
104 SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 5, para. 2.1.
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remedy) can create confusion with respect to how they may be
exercised. For instance, one major issue is that the automatic
nature of the de-registration remedy seems to be qualified by
the phrase “subject to any applicable safety laws and regula-
tions,” which has been used to allow a State to inappropriately
make the de-registration remedy more difficult to exercise.105 Al-
though there are certainly other sources of the confusion, any-
thing that can minimize confusion and risk will give creditors
more confidence in the CTC106 and, in turn, facilitate the
growth of the aviation industry. Therefore, if ICAO could clarify
that it expressly defers governing the process of de-registration
to other legal instruments, in accordance with the Chicago Con-
vention, then it would be furthering its facilitation purpose with-
out contravening its safety purpose.
Accordingly, despite the fact that the Chicago Convention
and the CTC do overlap to a certain extent, the distinguishable
requirements under the respective treaties provides an opportu-
nity for ICAO to clarify its limited role regarding de-registration.
This would allow for more predictability under the CTC, while
not making aviation any less safe in the process. In fact, ICAO
has made similar steps in the past with respect to its flexibility
towards the developments in the aviation financing and leasing
industry, which is discussed in the next section.
V. THE TREND TOWARD ICAO’S ACCEPTANCE OF THE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AIRCRAFT FINANCING
AND LEASING INDUSTRY
ICAO’s trend toward accepting the developments in the air-
craft financing and leasing industry is a positive indication that
ICAO can, and would, be willing to help minimize ambiguity in
aircraft financing and leasing regimes. Particularly in recent
105 See Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 62.
106 As with any legal instrument, interested parties want to be confident that
the framework, in this case the CTC, will work properly in the event of a problem
arising. Cf. Wool & Jonovic, supra note 82, at 72 (emphasizing the importance of
a party’s ability “to fully rely on these CTC provisions” in the context of national
regulations implementing the CTC’s terms). This is especially true for parties to
aircraft financing and leasing transactions, which involve extremely valuable as-
sets such as aircraft equipment. Even a relatively small boost in confidence could
make the difference between a creditor deciding to finance or lease an aircraft
and that creditor avoiding the transaction entirely. Cf. Gerber & Walton, supra
note 4, at 49 n.1 (discussing an asset financier’s basic risk analysis and how uncer-
tainty with respect to its ability to access its asset in the event of default can cause
the financier to avoid the transaction entirely).
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years, ICAO has been successful in framing itself flexibly in a
way that furthers both Chicago Convention purposes of advanc-
ing aviation safety and facilitating the economic developments
that are occurring in the industry in other spheres.107
This is especially the case with respect to ICAO’s efforts in
facilitating the aircraft financing and leasing industry. For exam-
ple, ICAO assisted in the development of the Aircraft Equip-
ment Protocol itself when the Cape Town Convention seemed
to be slowing to a halt in terms of progress.108 An internal exam-
ple of ICAO’s efforts towards flexibility in terms of accepting the
trends of the aircraft financing and leasing industry is that ICAO
amended the Chicago Convention to include, inter alia, Article
83 bis, which allows for the transfer of some of the State of regis-
try obligations109 to the State of operation in situations where an
aircraft is operated in a jurisdiction that is different than the
State of registry.110 The motivation behind this amendment was
the increasing trend of aircraft financing transactions occurring
in a cross-border context, where the operator is located in one
State and the financier or security holder is in another.111 Given
that the Chicago Convention was not clear with respect to
whether such a transfer agreement would be valid under the
terms of the treaty, ICAO felt it was necessary to clarify that it
did not prohibit this kind of transfer of responsibilities to the
State of operation, so long as it meets certain baseline require-
ments (i.e. it has been registered with ICAO and made pub-
lic).112 This shows not only that it is possible for ICAO to make
such clarifications of its own scope known with respect to the
Chicago Convention, but also that ICAO is willing to do so to
facilitate the aircraft financing and leasing industry.
In fact, the amendment to the Chicago Convention that ad-
ded Article 83 bis has been a success. ICAO established an “Arti-
cle 83 bis Task Force” in 2014 to explore and attempt to solve
the problems that may be associated with “the implementation
107 See HUANG, supra note 27, at 37–40.
108 See HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 32, at 352.
109 Article 83 bis does not allow for the transfer of all of the State of registry’s
responsibilities, only those enumerated in Article 83 bis. See Chicago Convention,
supra note 25, art. 83 bis.
110 See HUANG, supra note 27, at 33.
111 See id.
112 See Chicago Convention, supra note 25, art. 83 bis (b).
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of Article 83 bis by some member States.”113 The work accom-
plished by the Article 83 bis Task Force, as presented to ICAO’s
Legal Committee during its 36th session in 2015, was heavily ap-
plauded by the Legal Committee’s delegations, which “generally
expressed strong support for” all of the Task Force’s recommen-
dations. 114 All of this activity is evidence of ICAO’s promotion
of the aviation financing and leasing industry through what in a
large respect amounts to amending the Chicago Convention. As
a result, it supports the fact that the Chicago Convention should
be interpreted flexibly in this case to allow for other important
legal instruments (e.g. the CTC) with promising potential to
have their full, intended effect so long as doing so does not un-
dermine the Chicago Convention’s purpose or provisions. 115
Although it is likely that the majority of Member-states of both
the Chicago Convention and the CTC can and will reconcile the
registration overlap appropriately, there is still a risk that some
will not. Specifically, there is the risk that a Member-state will
inappropriately claim, for instance, that the CTC’s IDERA rem-
edy, or the framework in place for registration and de-registra-
tion by a foreign state, is not contemplated under the Chicago
Convention to “justify” its refusal to de-register an aircraft.116
This risk has the potential to do serious damage to the CTC,
given the significance of the IDERA remedy to the proper func-
tioning of the treaty. Any decrease in certainty with respect to
whether the CTC’s remedies will provide a potential financier
with real protection in practice increases transaction costs and
decreases that financier’s incentive to enter into the transac-
113 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Report of the 36th Session of the Legal
Committee, para. 2.5, ICAO Doc. LC/36 (Nov. 30–Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter ICAO
Report].
114 Id. paras. 2.13–2.20.
115 As mentioned supra, the Vienna Convention’s general rule of interpreta-
tion contemplates certain subsequent agreements or instruments regarding the
treaty as being useful to interpretation. See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art.
31(2)–(3). This would include the ICAO activity and agreements surrounding
Article 83 bis, which bolster the interpretation that the Chicago Convention is
meant to facilitate the growth of the aviation industry so long as the method of
growth does not bring with it unbearable safety implications. See id. This would
include the facilitation of other treaties or legal instruments, especially to the
extent that those other instruments do not implicate safety issues under the Chi-
cago Convention.
116 Cf. Gerber & Walton, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing the possibility of a State
purposefully misinterpreting the CTC’s remedies to inappropriately justify bene-
fitting itself).
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tion.117 Of course, on the other hand, an increase in certainty
would increase the reliability of the CTC’s protections, and as a
result, the number of entities deciding to finance or lease
aircraft.
Again, this shows why it is appropriate for ICAO to make it
clear that it leaves the process of de-registration up to other le-
gal instruments. Ultimately, one of the Chicago Convention’s
purposes is to facilitate the growth of the aviation industry. The
Cape Town Convention’s major purpose is to facilitate that
growth through drastically decreasing the risk of entering into
aircraft financing and leasing transactions. Therefore, any clari-
fication emphasizing that the Chicago Convention’s registration
provisions do not hinder other instruments’ constructs of de-
registration—an issue that almost entirely avoids safety implica-
tions as mentioned supra—would itself further the Chicago Con-
vention’s purpose of facilitating growth in the aviation industry.
VI. PROPOSAL TO AMEND ANNEX 7 OF
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
With the foregoing in mind, ICAO should clarify its limited
role with respect to the governing of aircraft de-registration.
Such a clarification by ICAO has the potential to yield exponen-
tial benefits to the aircraft financing and leasing industry and,
consequently, the aviation industry on the whole. One of the
biggest ways modern ICAO contributes to creating a uniform
understanding of international aviation laws is through Annexes
to the Chicago Convention.118 Specifically, ICAO should under-
take to amend Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention—“Aircraft
Nationality and Registration Marks.”119 In that Annex, ICAO
should formally defer the governance of de-registration
processes to other legal instruments, provided that one baseline
requirement is met: for the Annex 7 deferral to apply, “de-regis-
tration process” means only such processes that are “purely doc-
umentary.”120 The amendment should not only recognize that
117 See SIR GOODE’S OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 5, para. 2.1; Gerber &
Walton, supra note 4, at 49; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 12.
119 Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, INT’L CIVIAL AVIATION
ORG. [ICAO] annex 7, http://www.icao.int/safety/AirNavigation/Nationality
Marks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CV3-XFRK].
120 This requirement, or some version of this basic principle, would ensure that
the amendment to Annex 7 does not implicate safety concerns. See supra notes
89–91 and accompanying text.
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aircraft de-registration is an element of transferring registration
under Article 17, but also expressly state that neither the Chi-
cago Convention nor ICAO intends to exert governance or con-
trol over those de-registration processes, provided that those
processes contemplate aircraft de-registration as an exclusively
documentary endeavor. The result of this clarification would be
to instill further confidence in important legal instruments,
such as the CTC, which are more appropriate for defining and
governing how aircraft or aircraft equipment should be de-
registered.
This is not the first time such an amendment has been pro-
posed. In fact, in reviewing the 36th session report of ICAO’s
Legal Committee, it is clear that a general amendment regard-
ing what rules govern de-registration was suggested.121 Although
the report of the Legal Committee is not specific with respect to
what this amendment should entail or how it should be accom-
plished, this author believes that the best approach is explicit
deference of control over de-registration processes. Such an
amendment would contribute to a more uniform understanding
of the Chicago Convention’s—and ICAO’s—approach to air-
craft de-registration and would allow for further reliance on le-
gal instruments that have the potential to yield large benefits in
aviation. Ultimately, that type of express clarification would have
a tremendously positive effect on growing the aviation industry
without compromising aviation safety in the slightest.
VII. CONCLUSION
Aircraft de-registration, although not explicitly mentioned in
the Chicago Convention, is a necessary element in transferring
an aircraft’s registration in compliance with the Chicago Con-
vention’s single-state aircraft registration requirement. At the
same time, interpretation of the Chicago Convention’s registra-
tion provisions indicates that ICAO should defer governance of
de-registration processes to other entities or legal instruments.
By electing not to interfere with how registration or its transfers
are accomplished, the Chicago Convention protects the oppor-
tunity for more appropriate instruments such as the CTC to de-
velop rules that control the de-registration process.
121 ICAO Report, supra note 113, para. 2.17. Specifically, the ICAO Report
notes that one delegate suggested that “consideration should eventually be given
by the Secretariat to amend Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention so as to provide
States with international rules governing de-registration of aircraft.” Id.
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However, the Chicago Convention’s failure to specifically
mention the de-registration issue may unnecessarily create ambi-
guity in future interpretations by interested parties. This creates
the potential for either confusion or intentional, self-serving
misinterpretation with respect to whether the Chicago Conven-
tion (or ICAO) controls de-registration. This is especially true
on the issue of whether those other more appropriate instru-
ments that do specifically establish de-registration rules (e.g. the
CTC) are at all in conflict with the Chicago Convention. Given
the necessity of a clear, readily exercisable de-registration rem-
edy for aviation financiers and lessors, either of those situations
(innocent misinterpretation or otherwise) drastically undercuts
the value of legal instruments that do control de-registration,
such as the CTC.
To remedy this issue, ICAO should amend Annex 7 of the
Chicago Convention to do two things: (1) explicitly recognize
de-registration as an element of transferring an aircraft’s regis-
tration; and (2) clearly and expressly defer governance over the
process of de-registering aircraft to other legal instruments.
However, to ensure that the aviation safety purpose of the Chi-
cago Convention is not contravened, the amendment should
also stipulate that it defers governance of the de-registration
process to other regimes only to the extent that the regime-at-
issue’s de-registration process embodies the “purely documen-
tary” essence described in Sir Goode’s Official Commentary as ex-
isting under the CTC. Such an amendment would increase
confidence in the CTC and other important instruments that
integrally require the ability to control the process of de-registra-
tion. The result would be exponential benefit to the aviation in-
dustry’s growth without sacrificing safety.
